Abstract
We investigate how emigration from a developing region is affected by xenophobic violence at destination. Based on a unique household survey collected in Mozambique in summer 2008, a few months after a series of xenophobic attacks in South Africa that killed dozens and displaced thousands of immigrants from neighboring countries, we estimate migration intentions of Mozambicans before and after the attacks, controlling for a placebo period. We focus on the role of family and social networks in the sending community in shaping changes in the expressed intentions to migrate. We find that the migration intention of household heads decreases after the violence, especially for those household heads with many children whose families have no access to social networks. The results illustrate that networks at origin insure risks related to migration and that, when deciding to migrate, workers tend to care more about the future of their offspring than their own health.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The theoretical literature suggests that small groups or networks (e.g., Genicot and Ray 2003; Ambrus et al. 2010), with members who care for or trust each other and can punish reneging members, can achieve high levels of insurance (e.g., Altonji et al. 1992; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; La Ferrara 2002). The empirical evidence from a set of developing countries is consistent with these predictions (Ligon 1998; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Dubois et al. 2008; Ambrus et al. 2010).
See Vicente (2010) for a paper using a similar methodology.
Since the ordered probit results are harder to summarize, we use the dichotomous measure by aggregating the different degrees of positive migration intentions and estimate probit specification. Yet, we also run ordered probit regressions using the four categories, and results are available upon request.
We also run additional models to estimate interaction effects. We run both linear probability models and probit model marginal effects using the command inteff in Stata developed by Norton et al. (2004). The latter command allows to compute the correct marginal effect and significance of the interaction variable in a probit model. Results are consistent with those reported in Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18 in the Appendix (results available upon request).
We also test interaction effects of informal social ties as a measure of social networks, finding similar results as using household group participation (results available upon request).
Notice also that we do not look at the onset of the migration phenomenon in Mozambique when social help through networks would be particularly important. Rather, migration between Mozambique and South Africa is a long-lasting and widespread phenomenon. While Mozambicans have historically been the main labor force for South African mines, most of today’s migration from Mozambique is not permanent (life cycle) but temporary or circular migration, for which the role of networks is believed to be less important (Massey et al. 1994). From our survey, we know that 80 % of the current migration is temporary migration. The average duration of the migration spell by returned migrants is 9 months.
The most recent South African census refers to the year 2007, but there is no information on the country of origin for migrants. The census of 1996 shows the same path as for the 2001 census presented here.
References
AfDB/OECD (2003) African Economic Outlook 2002/2003. Country studies: Mozambique. OECD and African Development Bank, Paris
AfDB/OECD (2008) African Economic Outlook 2008. Country studies: Mozambique. OECD and African Development Bank, Paris
Ai C, Norton E (2003) Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Econ Lett 80:123–129
Altonji L, Hayashi F, Kotliko L (1992) Is the extended family altruistically linked? Direct tests using micro data. AER, 1177–98
Ambrus A, Mobius M, Szeidl A (2010) Consumption risk-sharing in social networks. NBER working papers 15719, National Bureau of Economic Research
Asbury H (1927) The gangs of New York: an informal history of the underworld. Dorset, New York
Burda MC, Härdle W, Müller M, Werwatz A (1998) Semiparametric analysis of German east-west migration intentions: facts and theory. JAppEconometrics 13(5):525–541
Crush J (2008) The perfect storm: the realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. The Southern Africa Migration Project, Migration Policy Series, 50
Docquier F, Lowell B, Marfouk M (2009) A gendered assessment of highly skilled emigration. Pop&DevRev 35(2):297–322
Drinkwater S, Ingram P (2009) How different are the British in their willingness to move? Evidence from international social survey data. Reg Stud 43(2):287–303
Dubois P, Bruno J, Magnac T (2008) Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs: theory and empirical evidence. Econometrica 76(4):679–725
Epstein GS, Gang IN (2006) The influence of others on migration plans. RevDevE 10(4):652–665
Fafchamps M (1992) Solidarity networks in preindustrial societies: rational peasants with a moral economy. EcDev&CultChge 41(1):147–174
Fafchamps M, Lund S (2003) Risk sharing networks in rural Philippines. JDevE 71(2):261–287
Filmer D, Prichett L (2001) Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data or tears: an application to education enrolments in states of India. Demography 38(1):115–132
Foster A, Rosenzweig M (2001) Imperfect commitment, altruism and the family: evidence from transfer behavior in low-income rural areas. ReStat 83(3):389–407
Fouarge D, Ester P (2007) Determinants of international and regional migration intentions in Europe. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg
Genicot G, Ray D (2003) Group formation in risk-sharing arrangements. ReStud 70(1):87–113
Igglesden V, Monso T, Polzer T (2009) Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in South Africa: lessons learned following attacks on foreign nationals. Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand
La Ferrara E (2002) Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania. JPubE 85(2):235–73
Lam K-C (2002) Interaction between economic and political factors in the migration decision. JCE 30(3):488–504
Liebig T, Sousa-Poza A (2004) Migration, self-selection and income inequality: an international analysis. Kyklos 57:125–146
Ligon E (1998) Risk sharing and information in village economics. ReStud 65(4):847–864
Ligon E, Thomas J, Worrall T (2002) Informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment: theory and evidence from village economies. ReStud 69(1):209–244
Manski CF (1990) The use of intentions data to predict behaviour: a best-case analysis. JofASA 85(412):934–940
Massey DS (1988) International migration and economic development in comparative perspective. Pop&DevRev 14:383–414
Massey DS, Goldring LP, Durand J (1994) Continuities in transnational migration: an analysis of 19 Mexican communities. AJof S 99:1492–1533
McKenzie D, Rapoport H (2010) Self-selection patterns in Mexico-U.S. Migration: the role of migration networks. Rev Econ Stat 92(4):811–821
Mesnard A (2009) Migration, violence and welfare programmes in rural Colombia. IFS Working Paper W09/19
Norton E, Wang H, Ai C (2004) Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models. Stata J 4(2):154–167
Papapanagos H, Sanfey P (2001) Intention to emigrate in transition countries: the case of Albania. JPopE 14(3):491–504
PRSP (2007) Republic of Mozambique: poverty reduction strategy paper. IMF Country Report No 07/37
Van Dalen HP, Henkens K (2008) Emigration intentions: mere words or true plans? Explaining international migration intentions and behaviour. Discussion Paper 2008–60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Vicente P (2010) Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa. JDevE 92(1):28–38
Acknowledgements
We thank Alice Mesnard, Melissa Myambo, Luca Stanca, Pedro Vicente, and participants at the NORFACE-CREAM Conference on “Migration, Economic Change and Social Challenge” at UCL in London, the CEPR-TOM Conference on “International Migration: Transnational links, Effects and Policies” at Venice International University in Venice, the IZA Workshop on “Legal and Illicit Immigration: Theory, Empirics and Policy” in Bonn, and a seminar at the Goethe University in Frankfurt for comments and discussion. Financial support from the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano (LdA) for data collection is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are ours.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Responsible editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann
Appendix
Appendix
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Friebel, G., Gallego, J.M. & Mendola, M. Xenophobic attacks, migration intentions, and networks: evidence from the South of Africa. J Popul Econ 26, 555–591 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-012-0455-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-012-0455-3