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Military conscription and university enrolment: evidence from Italy

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Abstract

This paper analyses the effect of the abolition of compulsory military service (CMS) on university enrolment in Italy. A triple-difference model is used to account for various potentially confounding factors. The identification strategy exploits variation along three dimensions: (a) between gender, (b) between age-groups and (c) between time periods. The results show that there is no statistically significant evidence suggesting that the abolition of CMS has a causal effect on the decision to enrol in university studies. Estimates obtained employing a double-difference model exploiting variation along the dimensions (a) and (b) overestimate the effect. Finally, although there is no statistically significant overall effect, we find some evidence of heterogeneous effects between students from different social backgrounds.

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Notes

  1. The career interruption may last longer than the length of the military service as typically, due to bureaucratic reasons, there is a waiting period before men can actually start the service. Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) suggest that in the Netherlands the cost of doing military service is approximately equivalent to the cost of losing 2 years of potential work experience.

  2. The difference between the payment received by conscripts and the market value of their labour supply is equal to a supplementary income tax levied only on them during the whole period of service (Lau et al. 2004, p. 383). τ varies between 0, where conscripts receive the market value of labour (net of income taxes) and 1, where conscripts receive no pay.

  3. Suppose the taxation system is progressive. Hence, τ  ∣ ∣  is likely to be greater than τ  ∣  as we expect W U to be higher than W HS.

  4. It is assumed that the direct cost of a university education is zero.

  5. The theoretical model described above is based on the idea of maximizing income. However, CMS may influence individual’s decision to enrol in university studies through other factors. Academic skills might depreciate while serving in the military making people less likely to enrol in university studies. Additionally, that extra year out of school could lead individuals to rethink life, or a simple extra year of maturity could lead to a different decision about university studies.

  6. Whilst in the early 1980s the length of service was 12 months, in the late 1990s this was reduced to 10 months.

  7. For instance, if he was an orphan, a son or brother of a soldier who had died in war or a widower with dependent child.

  8. Unfortunately, we can only use the 2001 sample of high school graduates to test the plausibility of the DiD assumption. In 2001, the Italian higher education system embarked on a process of reform that changed the length of university studies by introducing the “3 + 2” model (for more details about this reform, see Bratti et al. 2006). Several studies (see, for instance, Cappellari and Lucifora 2009) show that this reform has significantly affected the university enrolment decision of high school graduates and there is also evidence of heterogeneous effects. Finally, one should note that data are unavailable between 2001 and 2004 as the Italian survey on high school graduates is only carried out every 3 years (see Section 5).

  9. As shown by Ai and Norton (2003), while in linear models the interpretation of the coefficient of the interaction between two variables is straightforward, this does not hold in non-linear models.

  10. There are no admission standards, except for specialized disciplines such as medicine and architecture.

  11. Four geographical areas are considered: North-East, North-West, South and Centre. Unfortunately, we are unable to define areas of residence at a more disaggregated level (i.e. region) given that this information is unavailable. The inclusion of dummies for area of residence allows us to control for labour market conditions across the geographical areas.

  12. Given the low direct cost of university education in Italy (compared to other countries such as, for instance, the US), tuition fees are unlikely to exert an influence on the enrolment decision even for individuals from less advantaged backgrounds. Previous studies (see, for instance, Di Pietro and Cutillo 2006) on the determinants of university enrolment in Italy have not considered the impact of this factor.

  13. Typically parents can freely decide to make their child attend primina. The child has the right to enrol in the second year of primary school as long as he/she passes a final exam.

  14. Several studies (see, for instance, Bertola and Checchi 2002) suggest that in Italy private schools play a remedial role. They tend to attract less talented students from wealthy backgrounds.

  15. Given our dataset, we are only able to estimate the probability of dropping out before the end of the third year.

  16. Data on the 1995 and 1998 samples also come from the national survey on high school graduates carried by the ISTAT. These data are unavailable before 1995.

  17. The inclusion of geographical area dummies in the specification allows us to control for differences in the wage differential between university and high school graduates living in the same area.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank two anonymous referees, Bruce D. Meyer, Lionel Page, Christopher R. Taber and participants at the 2009 annual meeting of the Spanish Economic Association for their helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper circulated as IZA Discussion Paper No. 4212. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Giorgio Di Pietro.

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Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno

Appendix

Appendix

Table 8 Effect of the abolition of CMS on university drop-out (conditional on enrolment): double-difference estimates

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Di Pietro, G. Military conscription and university enrolment: evidence from Italy. J Popul Econ 26, 619–644 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-012-0407-y

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