Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of an increase in the foreign skilled wage rate on the emigration and education decisions of individuals in the home economy. An increase in the foreign skilled wage rate encourages emigration of skilled workers out of the home country, while possible increase in the supply of skilled labor in the home depends on the technological relationship between skilled and unskilled labor in production. Although the average education level will rise when they are complements, the average education level may not necessarily be raised when they are substitutes.
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Notes
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) distinguished labor markets into skilled and unskilled types, but they assumed that the two types of labor are independent technologically in output production. For example, Johnson (1997) empirically suggests the close, albeit imperfect substitutability in the production process.
Galor and Stark (1991) made a similar assumption.
Piketty (1997) showed that due to imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled, brain drain exerts negative externalities on home workers, although he did not endogenize skilled/unskilled choice of individuals.
For simplicity, we specify the relationship as di/dj = − a < 0 in the following.
In reality, there can be individuals whose utility costs of acquiring the skills are high although the emigrating costs are sufficiently low. For those individuals, it may be worth while acquiring skills only contingent on emigration. Andersen (2005) takes such individuals into consideration, but we rule out the case for analytical convenience.
The immigration from developing economies is sufficiently small relative to the stock of skilled labor in the recipient economy, so that its effect on the wage rate in the recipient economy will be negligible (e.g., Grubel and Scott 1966).
It is known that when skilled and unskilled labors are imperfect substitutes, we will not have complete brain drain.
Since \(\hat{i}\) is the i index of the individual who has \(j=\hat{j}\), in order to have skilled workers in the home, we must have \(\frac{w^{s}}{1+r}-e\big( {\hat{j}} \,\big)>\frac{w^{ s^\ast }}{1+r}-e\big( {\hat{j}} \,\big)-c\big( {\hat{i}} \,\big)\). The present study considers this case and rules out the case in which an individual has indices ( i,j ) such that \(\frac{w^{s}}{1+r}-e( j )<w^u+\frac{w^u}{1+r}<\frac{w^{ s^\ast }}{1+r}-e( j )-c( i )\). See also footnote 6 for the implications of this assumption.
The (semi-)indirect utility function implicitly postulates optimal consumption-saving choices of individuals, that is, individuals choose savings for given wage and interest rates. In a small open economy, the difference between capital investment and savings is covered by foreign borrowing or lending. By definition, the foreign borrowing or lending remains constant in a steady state.
We evaluate all the variables at the original equilibrium in the following part of this paper.
It should be recalled that we are concerned with comparative statics for a small open economy.
In interpreting the results, it should be recalled that the effect of an increase in the foreign skilled wage rate also includes the indirect effect through changes in capital stock.
As Galor (1986) showed in his model, it is reasonable to expect that the emigration rate is positively affected by the foreign skilled wage rate.
We assume that condition \(\tilde{i}>\hat{i}\) still holds.
Poutvaara (2008) showed that region-specific shocks may affect human capital formation negatively. However, his result assuming identical individuals depends on the shape of production function, presented by the third derivative, while we are concerned with technological relationship between skilled and unskilled labor in production.
In the literature on public investment, Burgess (2006) and others envisaged a case in which the cross derivatives with respect to two factors are negative.
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank two anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. They are also indebted to the seminar participants at the Nagoya Macroeconomics Workshop for their helpful comments.
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Appendix: Production sector
Appendix: Production sector
As the interest rate is fixed at the world level, we have from Eq. 2a
Substituting Eq. 20 into the following equations
which are obtained from Eqs. 2b and 2c, we have
where
Assuming monotonicity of the labor demand functions with respect to the wage rates, we obtain the labor demand functions of a small open economy Eqs. 2b and 2c in the text. From Eqs. 29 and 30, we have \(L_{s}^{u} [ {\equiv \partial L^{u}/\partial w^{s}} ]=\big( {UU-SU\frac{US}{SS}} \big)^{-1}\big( {-\frac{US}{SS}} \big)\), where \(UU-SU\frac{US}{SS}<0\) from the assumption. When ∣ F jj ∣ is sufficiently great and \(F_{L^{s}L^{u}} \) is positive (negative) and sufficiently great (small), we may have \(L_{s}^{u} <0\) (\(L_{s}^{u} >0\), respectively).Footnote 17
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Fan, X., Yakita, A. Brain drain and technological relationship between skilled and unskilled labor: brain gain or brain loss?. J Popul Econ 24, 1359–1368 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-010-0321-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-010-0321-0