Abstract
This paper considers an economic analysis of intergenerational transition of ethnic and social trait. We consider the level of social traits chosen by parents and its effect on their children’s choice of ethnic and social traits when reaching adulthood. We develop a theory that suggests that parents will chose extreme ethnic and social traits to increase the cost that their children will pay if they wish to deviate from their parents’ “ideal.” The extreme choice of the ethnic social traits of parents has an effect on the segregation of minorities and migrants.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Laura Shuck and two anonymous referees for their constructive and helpful comments. Some of this work was completed while visiting IZA, Bonn, which I thank for its courtesy.
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Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno
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Epstein, G.S. Extremism within the family. J Popul Econ 20, 707–715 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0100-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0100-0