Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics

, Volume 147, Issue 1, pp 71–106 | Cite as

Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence

  • Udo Schneider
  • Jürgen Zerth
Open Access


This paper explores the effects of insurance parameters and complementary information environment on the patient’s primary prevention activity. The theoretical model is based on a principal-agent setting in which the patient acts as an agent in deciding about his prevention efforts. The insurer chooses the coverage level and therefore the level of patient’s cost sharing and decides on his monitoring activities. The empirical analysis looks at the patient’s prevention decision in the case of smoking. Using a hazard model in discrete time, the decision to change behaviour depends on health status, education, age and working time but not on the insurance system.


I12 D82 C23 


incentives in prevention information distribution hazard model 


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Copyright information

© Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BayreuthChair of Public FinanceBayreuth, udoGermany
  2. 2.International Dialog College and Research InstituteDiakonie NeuendettelsauNeuendettelsauGermany

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