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Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics

, Volume 146, Issue 2, pp 507–532 | Cite as

Interchange fees as a mechanism to raise rivals’ costs — some evidence from Switzerland

  • Samuel Rutz
Open Access
Article
  • 46 Downloads

Summary

In 2004 the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) opened an investigation concerning multilateral agreed interchange fees in the Swiss credit card market which ended with an amicable settlement. The most important element of this amicable settlement consists in the limitation of the interchange fee to the actual network costs of the issuers. In this paper I discuss whether there was a market failure in the Swiss credit card market which justified the intervention by ComCo and whether the remedies imposed in the amicable settlement eliminated the alleged market failure.

JEL-Classification

L4 G2 

Keywords

antitrust payment systems interchange fees two-sided markets 

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Copyright information

© Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BerneSwitzerland

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