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Non-FDI Capital Inflows in Low-Income Countries: Catching the Wave?

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Abstract

Low-income countries (LICs) are typically characterized by intermittent and very modest access to private external funding sources. Motivated by recent developments in private flows to these economies, this paper makes two contributions: first, it constructs a new comprehensive dataset on gross private capital flows with special focus on non-FDI flows to LICs. Concentrating on LICs and more specifically on gross non-FDI private flows is intentionally aimed at closing a gap in existing datasets where country coverage of developing economies is limited mainly to emerging markets (EMs). Second, using the new data, it identifies several shifting patterns of gross non-FDI private inflows to LICs. A surprising fact emerges: since the mid-2000s periods of surges in gross non-FDI private inflows to LICs are broadly comparable to those of EMs. Moreover, while gross non-FDI inflows to LICs are on average much lower than those to EMs, we show that gross non-FDI inflows to the top quartile of LICs are comparable to those of the median EM and converging to the top quartile of EMs.

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Figure 1

Source: WEO and BOPS databases.

Figure 2

Source: Extended LIC database.

Figure 3

Source: Extended LIC database. The subplots show the average of gross FDI private inflows and non-FDI private inflows as a percent of GDP for the LIC sample and subgroups. The LIC sample consists of 58 countries. The small states subgroup includes 6 countries. The fragile states subgroup excludes small states and contains 20 countries. The non-small and non-fragile states subgroup includes 32 countries.

Figure 4

Source: Extended LIC database.

Figure 5

Source: Extended LIC database.

Figure 6

Source: BOPS. It includes only inflows to the private sector classified as banks and other sectors (OS).

Figure 7

Source: Extended LIC database. Shares are calculated by dividing non-FDI private inflows as a share of GDP by the sum of non-FDI private inflows as a share of GDP and FDI inflows as a share of GDP. Trends are the result of a regression of the series over the year.

Figure 8

Source: Extended LIC database.

Figure 9

Source: Extended LIC database. Frequency of surges (LICs \(+\) EMs) is the total number of countries experiencing surges in a given year as a percent of the total number of countries for which data were available in that same year. Frequency of surges (LICs) refers to the number of LIC countries experiencing a surge in a given year as a percent of the total number of countries for which data were available in that same year.

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Notes

  1. In this paper, we use the terms low-income countries (LIC) and low-income developing countries (LIDC) interchangeably. The definition of LIDCs comprises countries that were designated eligible for the International Monetary Fund’s concessional lending vehicle Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and had a level of per capital Gross National Income (GNI) less than the PRGT income graduation level for non-small states (USD 2,390).

  2. The dataset is publicly available at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper.

  3. In line with the literature, inflows refer to changes in nonresident holdings of domestic assets and outflows to changes in resident holdings of foreign assets. Net flows refer to the difference between inflows and outflows.

  4. To allow for comparative analysis, we apply the same methodology to other flows and country groups and include FDI and non-FDI flows (inflows, outflows) for AMs, EMs and LICs in the database.

  5. Exceptions include Lane (2015), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) which identify various periods of capital flow bonanzas in LICs but with no distinction among official and non-official financing, and Alfaro and others (2014) that distinguish between private and public net capital flows in 134 non-advanced economies for the period 1980–2007 (a closer look at Alfaro and others, (2014), and how it compares with this paper will be provided later on).

  6. Interestingly, a careful look at the data also indicates a shift from the residual component category to more well-identified components.

  7. With respect to the LIC group, data are not available for Somalia and South Sudan. Somalia lacked a government recognized by the IMF for most of the covered period and South Sudan became independent only in 2011.

  8. BOPS is compiled by the IMF and contains the detailed data used in compiling the Balance of Payments Yearbook. A portion of these data appears in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset. For more information, see: www.imf.org/external/data.htm.

  9. The original version of the database used BPM5. See Appendix A.2 for a brief discussion of the main differences between BPM5 and the most recent version BPM6 along with a discussion of the reasons underlying our original decision to use BPM5 and the recent switch to BPM6. For a detailed conversion matrix between the two versions, see: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/matrix.

  10. Portfolio Investment includes equity securities and debt securities in the form of bonds and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives such as options. Other Investment is a residual category for all financial transactions not covered in direct and Portfolio Investment, or reserve assets. It is composed by trade credits, loans, currency and deposits, and other assets and liabilities. Trade credits are the direct extension of credit by suppliers and buyers and advance payments for transactions associated with trade of goods and services. Loans comprise direct lending of funds through an arrangement with no security evidencing the transaction or a non-negotiable document or instrument. Currency consists of notes and coin that are in circulation and commonly used to make payments. Deposits consist of deposits that are exchangeable on demand at par and all claims reflecting evidence of deposit. More detailed definitions may be found at the Balance of Payments Manual webpage (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/bopman6.htm).

  11. The concept used from BIS is locational banking statistics. It provides quarterly data on international financial claims and liabilities of bank offices resident in the BIS (44 countries report to BIS, comprising most advanced market and financial centers). Both domestic and foreign-owned banking offices in the reporting countries report their outstanding positions, including those vis-a-vis own affiliates. The locational banking statistics are compiled using principles that are consistent with balance of payments data. EPFR is a database that tracks data at weekly frequency on institutional investors that use vehicles such as mutual funds to allocate resources. As such, it covers part of the flows in the liabilities side of the portfolio component (bond and equity) of the financial account of the balance of payments. Dealogic is an electronic platform used by investment banks worldwide and provides comprehensive information on global primary market equity, bond and loans.

  12. It is usually the case that the asset sides of the components of the financial account of many LICs are composed only by streams of zeros, since LICs rarely export capital (decrease in liabilities are possible). When WEO inputs the net flow on the liability side and BOPS showed nonzero values in the asset side, we did not use WEO data to fill gaps in BOPS data.

  13. In this, we follow Forbes and Warnock (2012): “First, if there is a string of NAs surrounded by strings of zeros, we replace those interior NAs with zeros.” The procedure used in their paper regarding errors and omissions is not feasible here, since we would not be able to assign inflows and outflows with respect to the components of the financial account.

  14. A notable example in the previous version of the database was the case of Mauritius. From 2010 onwards, the country implemented a new survey regarding capital flows related to Global Business Companies (GBC) operating in Mauritius. BOPS data includes those flows for 2010–2012, which represents a major structural break in the series. For that reason, BPM5 WEO did not incorporate these flows and were used in our previous version of the database. WEO BPM6 includes those new flows and hence so does our database. Information can be found in the MetaData of the database.

  15. See Appendix A.2 for a detailed description of the cases where BOPS data were supplemented or replaced by WEO data.

  16. The official codes for these components in the WEO database are: Official Liabilities (including use of fund credit)BFOLG, Liabilities to Official CreditorsBFOL_G. BFOL_O and BFOL_B refer to the complementary groups (banks and other sectors).

  17. The only information available is in the item of which: use of fund credit and loans from the fund that refers solely to IMF operations with the country and does not encompass other multilateral institutions. WEO also provides a similar component for Portfolio Investment, called BFPL_G. Information on direct investment by official creditors is rare.

  18. This synthetic series is produced by simply adding the subcomponents Monetary Authorities and General Government for the appropriate categories of Other Investments.

  19. Malaysia was the only case where we complemented the series in the years of 2010–2012 by using coefficients estimated from a regression of the relationship between BOPS and WEO series in the previous years. This was done for the sake of completeness, since this series would be the only one missing for Malaysia in the whole set.

  20. Major outliers are: Bahrain and Bahamas that are financial centers, which means that inflows should be analyzed in conjunction with outflows (assets). In 1991, Kuwait’s GDP shrank dramatically due to a severe reduction in oil production during the Gulf War, resulting in a large ratio of capital flows over GDP.

  21. For the details of these comparisons, see Appendix D.

  22. Using this definition, there are a total of 29 developing small states in our database, including LICs and EMs (4 small states were not included in the database due to lack of data). See Appendix E for a list of developing small states covered in our dataset and IMF (2013) for further explanation.

  23. We use the World Bank Definition of Fragile States based on the following two criteria: (a) a harmonized average Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score of 3.2 or less; (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the previous three years. Both criteria are highly correlated with the occurrence of episodes of organized violence (World Bank, 2011). See Appendix E for a list of developing fragile states covered in our dataset.

  24. The breakdown of Figure 6 is consistent with the underlying BOPS database.

  25. We further investigate to what extent an increase in gross non-FDI private inflows has been offset by an increase in assets in the same categories. As Appendix F shows, in countries such as Cambodia, Nigeria and Zambia, non-FDI net private flows have been mostly negative, indicating a larger increase in resident’s foreign assets relative to liabilities. In other countries, such as Kenya, Madagascar and Nicaragua, the opposite seems to hold. In Vietnam, while in the years prior to the financial crisis there was a larger increase in resident’s liabilities toward nonresidents, outflows have mostly offset inflows in following years.

  26. At the same time, we recognize that there are also some potential drawbacks to our approach including missing out on misclassified flows (e.g., FDI and inter-company loans) and missing out on interesting co-movements in FDI and other types of flows, as well as the substitutability between different types of flows. While interesting we leave this investigation to future research.

  27. Some studies in the literature (e.g., Forbes and Warnock, 2012) have chosen to adopt an “increase factor” approach inspired by the sudden stop literature which might be more appropriate to identify the periods of acceleration in inflows (when inflows start to pick up).

  28. This threshold captures well-known periods of capital flows expansions, and it is close to the median of the series of number of countries with surges.

  29. This is in line with the findings of Lane (2015) for net financial flows and debt inflows during the crisis.

  30. Araujo and others (2017) analyze the relationship between capital inflows and the economic cycle of the receiver country. One of the main findings is that capital flows to LICs are more persistent than to EMs and less related to the cycle, which is in line with the pattern observed here.

  31. The data are available at the Balance of Payments data portal, hosted on the IMF eLibrary.

  32. The countries with own reported BPM6-basis data as well as the date when BPM6 starts (in parenthesis) are: Albania (2013Q1), Angola (2009), Armenia (1993Q1), Australia (1995Q1), Austria (2006Q1), Azerbaijan (2013Q1), Bangladesh (2005Q1), Barbados (2011), Belarus (2000Q1), Belgium (2008Q1), Belize (2011Q1), Benin (2011), Bermuda (2006Q1), Bhutan (2006Q1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007Q1), Brazil (2014Q1), Brunei (2012), Bulgaria (2010Q1), Burundi (2005), Cambodia (2005Q1), Canada (1981Q1), Chile (2009Q1), Hong Kong (1998Q1), Macao (2002), China (2005Q1), Colombia (2000Q1), Costa Rica (2009Q1), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Croatia (2000Q1), Curaçao (2010Q4), Curaçao and Sint Maarten (2010Q4), Cyprus (2013Q1), Czech Republic (2008Q1), Denmark (2013Q1), Dominican Republic (2010Q1), El Salvador (1976Q1), Estonia (2009Q1), Fiji (2005Q1), Finland (2005Q1), France (1999Q1), Georgia (2000Q1), Germany (1991Q1), Ghana (2011Q1), Greece (2009Q1), Guatemala (2008Q1), Guinea-Bissau (2007), Hungary (1995Q1), Iceland (1995Q1), India (2009Q1), Indonesia (2010Q1) Iraq (2013Q1), Ireland (2014Q1), Italy (2008Q1), Jamaica (2011Q1), Japan (1996Q1), Kazakhstan (2000Q1), Kiribati (2006Q1), Korea (1980Q1), Kosovo (2013Q1), Kuwait (2009), Latvia (2000Q1), Lithuania (2004Q1), Luxembourg (2002Q1), Macedonia (1998Q1), Malawi (2003), Malaysia (2010Q1), Maldives (2011), Mali (2005), Malta (2008Q1), Marshall Islands (2005), Micronesia (2009), Moldova (2011Q1), Montenegro (2013Q1), Morocco (2013Q1), Mozambique (1996Q1), Myanmar (2013Q1), Nepal (2012Q1), Netherlands (2004Q1), New Zealand (2000Q1), Nicaragua (2005Q1), Niger (2011), Norway (2012Q1), Pakistan (2013Q1), Palau (2005), Philippines (2005Q1), Poland (2004Q1), Portugal (1999Q1), Romania (2013Q1), Russian Federation (2000Q1), Rwanda (2013), Samoa (2005Q1), São Tomé e Príncipe (1997Q1), Saudi Arabia (2005Q1), Senegal (2005), Serbia (2007Q1), Seychelles (2007Q1), Singapore (1995Q1), Sint Maarten (2010Q4), Slovak Republic (2013Q1), Slovenia (2008Q1), Solomon Islands (2006Q1), South Africa (2002Q1), Spain (1999Q1), Sri Lanka (2012Q1), Sudan (2014Q1), Sweden (2011Q1), Switzerland (1999Q1), Tajikistan (2014Q1), Tanzania (2010Q1), Thailand (2005Q1), Togo (2011), Tonga (2011Q1), Turkey (2006Q1), Tuvalu (2001), Uganda (2001Q1), Ukraine (2005Q1), United Kingdom (1999Q1), United States (1999Q1), Vanuatu (2010Q1), West Bank and Gaza (2000) and Zambia (2005Q1). Countries that are not included in this list had not migrated to BPM6 as of December 2015.

  33. The BPM6 code for BFOLG is BFOL_CBG_BP6. WEO no longer publishes BFOL_G.

  34. It is important to note here that in assessing coverage between the two datasets, we took a conservative approach and compared only nonzero values in each individual series. This approach was taken with the objective of avoiding accounting for missing variables that are mistakenly replaced by zeros. In contrast, for aggregate measures, we compute aggregate flows whenever there is at least one subcomponent available.

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Authors and Affiliations

Authors

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Correspondence to Juliana D. Araujo.

Additional information

*Juliana D. Araujo is in the Strategy, Policy and Review Department at the International Monetary Fund; her email address is: jaraujo@imf.org. Antonio C. David is in the Western Hemisphere Department at the International Monetary Fund; his email address is: adavid@imf.org. Carlos van Hombeeck is in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland; his email address is: carlos.vanhombeeck@bankofengland.co.uk. Chris Papageorgiou is in the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund; his email address is: cpapageorgiou@imf.org. We thank the editor, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and two referees for their excellent comments. We also benefited from discussions with John Bluedorn, Alina Carare, Rupa Duttagupta, Raphael Espinoza, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Philip Lane, Camelia Minoiu, Cathy Pattillo, Carlos Vegh, and participants at various workshops and conferences. We are grateful to the IMF Statistics Department for invaluable technical discussions. This work benefited from the financial support of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF.

Electronic supplementary material

Appendices

Appendix A: Database

1.1 A.1: Description

The database contains the following variables: Direct Investment Abroad, Direct Investment In Country, Portfolio Investment Assets, Portfolio Investment Liabilities, Portfolio Equity Assets, Portfolio Equity Liabilities, Portfolio Debt Assets, Portfolio Debt Liabilities, Financial Derivatives, Other Investment Assets, Other Investment Liabilities, Proxy for Official Other Investment Liabilities, Debt Forgiveness, Private Inflows Excluding Direct Investment (Portfolio Liabilities + Financial Derivatives + Other Investment Liabilities - Proxy for Official Other Investment Liabilities) and Private Outflows Excluding Direct Investment (Portfolio Assets + Other Investment Assets). Nominal GDP and Private Inflows excluding Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP and Private Outflows Excluding Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP are also included.

The database contains data for the period of 1990–2014 including 183 countries (58 Low-Income Developing Countries, 92 Other Developing Countries and 33 Advanced Economies). Advanced economies original BOPS data are included for completeness of the database. More detailed information, including the specific years when WEO data were used for each class of investment and each country, is available in the tab MetaData of the database. Except when indicated, data source for every country and component is the Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS), IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position  Manual 6 (BPM6). Years and/or time intervals (for example: 2001 and/or 2008–2010) indicate to the use of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) data series for the specified period. Besides the detailed information on the data used to fill the gaps by individual country and variable, the tab MetaData also contains:

  • IFS code: country code.

  • Type: 1 for Advanced Economies, 2 for Other Developing Countries and 3 for Low-Income Developing Countries.

  • Classification BFOLG and BFOL_G: Indicates correlation (High, Medium, Low) between “Official liabilities” and “Liabilities to official creditors” of WEO and BOPS series (BFOLG and BFOL_G). It does not include advanced economies.

  • Notes: country notes.

  • Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, current prices in U.S. dollars (Source WEO; Gross domestic product, current prices in national currency over National currency units per U.S. dollar, period average).

Figure 10 contains a snapshot for the line on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Figure 10
figure 10

Snapshot of MetaData

1.2 A.2: The Use of BPM6 and WEO Data

The IMF Statistical Department started publishing data according to the methodology presented in the Sixth Edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in the online Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) databases since August 2012. It is not the scope of this annex to explain the new methodology and the differences between the versions; hence we refer the interested reader to the relevant manuals. With respect to the financial account, the main differences refer to gross flows in Direct Investment (although net flows should not suffer major modifications) and changes in the sign of liabilities (negative to positive).

The original version of our database was based on the methodology presented in the Fifth Edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM5). The main reason for the use of BPM5 at the time was that the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database was still presented according to BPM5 methodology and thus comparison with BOPS BPM5, a resource heavily used in this project, was direct. Additionally, the series published according to the new methodology were usually shorter than the ones in BPM5 implying that some kind of conversion would be necessary to obtain longer series.

In order to make the process of updating the dataset easier in the future, an effort was made to convert the dataset to BPM6 and to extend coverage from 2012 to 2014. Two events helped support the conversion process of our database: WEO publication on a BPM6 basis started in October 2014; and in early 2016, the IMF Statistical Department released the entire historical series of Balance of Payments Statistics on a BPM6 basis by using a standardized conversion tool.Footnote 31 Currently, as shown in Figure 11, a large share of countries have already migrated to the BPM6 methodology, and in those cases, publication of BPM5 updated series have been discontinued.Footnote 32 For countries where data are still collected using BPM5 standard, the series are converted and published by the IMF Statistical Department in BPM6 facilitating future updates of the database. It is important to note that most series present breaking points between the data originally collected using BPM6 standard and data collected using BPM5 standard and converted by the IMF Statistical Department.

Figure 11
figure 11

Source: IMF BOPS. The sample includes 33 advanced markets (AM), 79 emerging markets (EM) and 70 low-income countries (LIC). Migration date as of December 2015.

Migration of Countries to BPM6 (percent of each group)

In what follows, we describe the methodology used to convert our database from BPM5 to BPM6. First, we identified when data were collected according to BPM6 in each country series. This was done by comparing the values of the BPM5 and BPM6 series backwards from 2012 year by year until 1990. The splicing point was identified as the first point where there was no significant difference (to the second digit to the right of the decimal mark) between BPM5 and BPM6 series. In the vast majority of cases, the splicing point corresponded to the year reported by the IMF Statical Department (listed in footnote 32) as the date up to when countries revised their series according to the new methodology. In that specific year, the new BPM6 series was connected to the BPM5 series. If no WEO data were used for the specific series, then the converted BPM5 series was used for the period prior to the splicing point. In most cases, series in the BPM5 standard and the converted BPM6 series are the same. Possible reasons for this are: information that could differentiate both series was not collected under the BPM5 standard and the differences between standards are not relevant at the level of aggregation of the database, specially because of the focus in the financial account.

For the cases where WEO data were used before the splicing point, the values were updated with WEO BPM6. In most cases, the WEO data were exactly the same as the one collected under BPM5. When WEO data were originally used after the new splicing point, if BOPS BPM6 data were no longer missing, then BOPS BPM6 series were left intact (i.e., no replacement by WEO data). In the case that gaps persisted in the BOPS BPM6, the same techniques described in Section II were implemented with the use of WEO BPM6.Footnote 33 The years of 2013 and 2014 were included in the database using BOPS BPM6. If BOPS BPM6 data were missing then WEO BPM6 was considered to fill the gaps (using the same techniques described in Section II). If WEO data were available for 2013–2014, but it was incompatible with BOPS, the gaps would remain. With the database converted to BPM6, BOPS BPM6 data can be used to update the extended LIC database. The cases when WEO BPM6 data were used for 2013–2014 are documented in the MetaData of the database and could be replaced by BOPS BPM6 data if available in the future.

A summary of the cases (specific years are reported in the MetaData of the database) where WEO data are used to supplement or replace BOPS data are (not including substitution of “n.a” for zeros): Foreign Direct Investment Abroad: Bhutan, Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Qatar, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Direct Investment In the Country: Bhutan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dem.Rep. of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Mauritania, Qatar, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Portfolio Assets: Belize, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Rep. of Congo, Gambia, Haiti, Qatar, São Tomé e Príncipe, Turkmenistan, UAE and Yemen. Portfolio Liabilities: Angola, Chad, Mongolia, Mozambique, Qatar, São Tomé e Príncipe, Seychelles, Turkmenistan, UAE and Uzbekistan. Other Investments Assets: Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Qatar, Senegal, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uzbekistan and Zambia. Other Investments Liabilities: Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Malaysia, Mauritania, Qatar, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uzbekistan and Zambia. OtherGov: Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

Appendix B: Comparison with BIS Data

See Figures 12 and 13.

Figure 12
figure 12

Other Private Investments Inflows and BIS Loans (U.S. dollars in millions)

Notes: From the extended LIC database, Other Investments private inflows are Other Investments subtracted of the proxy for Other Investments official flows. In the case of outflows, we use Other Investments assets, since official outflows are expected to be minimal. From BIS database, we use Table 7A of the Locational Banking Statistics, consistent with the balance of payments statistics. This table refers to Loans and deposits, which comprise interbank deposits and loans and advances, besides trade credit. This is closely related to Other Investments of the BoP. The counterpart is all sectors, which includes banks, non-bank financial institutions and non-financial sectors. Flows of assets and liabilities are calculated by difference in stocks and adjusted by exchange-rate change. BIS uses the currency breakdown to calculate the exchange-rate value-adjusted changes. The result is not identical to actual flow data (because the actual transactions are distributed over the whole year during which exchange rates may fluctuate, and because other valuation effects may impact stocks). Please note that axes are not always aligned in zero.

Figure 13
figure 13

Other Private Investments Inflows and BIS Loans (U.S. dollars in millions)

Notes: From the extended LIC database, Other Investments private inflows are Other Investments subtracted of the proxy for Other Investments official flows. In the case of outflows, we use Other Investments assets, since official outflows are expected to be minimal. From BIS database, we use Table 7A of the Locational Banking Statistics, consistent with the balance of payments statistics. This table refers to .Loans and deposits, which comprise interbank deposits and loans and advances, besides trade credit. This is closely related to Other Investments of the BoP. The counterpart is all sectors, which includes banks, non-bank financial institutions and non-financial sectors. Flows of assets and liabilities are calculated by difference in stocks and adjusted by exchange-rate change. BIS uses the currency breakdown to calculate the exchange-rate value-adjusted changes. The result is not identical to actual flow data (because the actual transactions are distributed over the whole year during which exchange rates may fluctuate, and because other valuation effects may impact stocks). Please note that axes are not always aligned in zero.

Appendix C: Comparison with FFA Dataset

We compare our dataset with the Financial Flows Analytics (FFA) dataset constructed by Bluedorn and others (2013). In general, data point coverage of our database is higher in almost every category of the financial account of the balance of payments for LICs. In terms of the aggregate measure of non-FDI private inflows, the increased coverage is 19 percent for the LIC group. For the components of this measure, the range of additional data for LICs varies from 8.4 percent (Official Other Investment Flows) to 13.4 percent (Other Investments Liabilities). In terms of the Other Investments and portfolio assets, the additional coverage is 9.1 and 8.1 percent, respectively, for the entire sample of LICs. In terms of direct investment into the country and direct investment abroad, coverage of our database is 16.1 percent and 1.7 percent greater for the group of LICs.Footnote 34

We provide some country examples in Figure 14 for the aggregate measure of non-FDI private inflows. Regarding the extended data, the range of cases goes from non available data from FFA (Uzbekistan) to only one observation missing for the last year (Cameroon). In some of the cases, there are large gaps in the middle of the series and mild discrepancies (Zambia). In the case of Madagascar and Mauritania, the data missing from FFA contains interesting patterns. The same is true for Bhutan, Comoros and Eritrea.

Figure 14
figure 14

Source: Extended LIC database and financial flows analytics.

Comparison between Extended LICs Database and FFA—Non-FDI Private Inflows (percent of GDP)

Appendix D: Comparison with Alfaro and others (2014) Dataset

We compare our dataset with the dataset from Alfaro and others (2014). Because they use a variety of measures of capital flows as well as different samples, an explanation of each one is given below. The measures of capital flows are:

  • Net capital flows (CA/GDP): 1980–2007 average of the annual current account balance with the sign reversed in current US dollars, normalized by GDP in current US dollars.

  • Net FDI + portfolio flows/GDP: The 1980–2007 average of the annual flows of foreign liabilities minus annual flows of foreign assets in current US dollars, normalized by GDP in current US dollars. Annual flows are computed as the difference between FDI plus portfolio equity investment liability and asset flows in current US dollars from the IMF (under source “IMF”) or as annual changes in stocks of FDI plus portfolio equity investment liabilities minus annual changes in assets in current US dollars, adjusted for valuation effects normalized by nominal GDP in US dollars (under source “LM” for Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), which includes valuation effects).

  • Net FDI + portfolio + private debt flows/GDP: it adds the annual changes in stocks of total debt from private creditors (private nonguaranteed debt and public and publicly guaranteed debt from private creditors) from World Bank to net FDI + portfolio flows/GDP computed from the IMF or LM data.

The main samples are:

  1. 1.

    Raw World: 22 advanced OECD countries and all non-OECD countries where data on their current account balances and GDP per capita are available for more than 30% of the sample over 1980–2007.

  2. 2.

    Raw Developing: Excludes 22 advanced OECD countries from Raw World.

  3. 3.

    Developing: Raw Developing sample minus the outlier countries based on formal econometric outlier tests in terms of capital flows and growth.

  4. 4.

    Benchmark: Raw Developing sample minus the outlier countries based on formal econometric outlier tests in terms of the components of capital flows (equity and public and publicly guaranteed debt) and growth.

As detailed above, the samples from Alfaro and others (2014) are based on the availability of data as well as exclusion of outliers. The comparison with our database is not direct, since the measures of interest and data sources in both papers are distinct. The closest definition used by Alfaro and others (2014) to the measure of interest in our paper is Net FDI + portfolio + private debt flows/GDP. Table 4 reports the correlation of this measure with our measure of gross non-FDI private inflows. Table 5 reports the correlation of this measure with a constructed measure from our database of net private inflows Net FDI + portfolio + other private flows/GDP. Correlations are not strikingly high, reflecting in part the different categories included in our measure of other flows, and by the fact highlighted by Alfaro and others (2014) (technical appendix), that for developing countries there are discrepancies between the loan flows reported in the IMFs BOP statistics and the changes in the external debt stocks as reported by the WBs GDF database. We also compared if each observations is available in each dataset for all LICs and years between 1990 and 2014. Our database provides, respectively, 17.3, 17.3, 22.1 and 30% more observations for LICs with comparison to the samples in the order of the list above (from Raw World to Benchmark), although their database has many more observations for earlier periods as their coverage starts in 1980.

Table 4 Correlation between Non-FDI Private Inflows from Extended LIC Database and AKV Private Flows
Table 5 Correlation between net FDI \(+\) non-FDI Private Flows from Extended LIC Database and AKV Private Flows

Appendix E: Sample of Countries

Country

LIC

Small\(^\mathrm{a}\)

Fragile\(^\mathrm{b}\)

Country

LIC

Small\(^\mathrm{a}\)

Fragile\(^\mathrm{b}\)

Afghanistan, I.R. of

x

 

x

Dominican Republic

   

Albania

   

Ecuador

   

Algeria

   

Egypt

   

Angola

  

x

El Salvador

   

Antigua and Barbuda

 

x

 

Equatorial Guinea

   

Argentina

   

Eritrea

x

 

x

Armenia

   

Estonia

   

Azerbaijan, Rep. of

   

Ethiopia

x

  

Bahamas, The

 

x

 

Fiji

 

x

 

Bahrain, Kingdom of

   

Gabon

   

Bangladesh

x

  

Gambia, The

x

  

Barbados

 

x

 

Georgia

  

x

Belarus

   

Ghana

x

  

Belize

 

x

 

Grenada

 

x

 

Benin

x

  

Guatemala

   

Bhutan

x

x

 

Guinea

x

 

x

Bolivia

x

  

Guinea-Bissau

x

 

x

Bosnia & Herzegovina

  

x

Guyana

 

x

 

Botswana

   

Haiti

x

 

x

Brazil

   

Honduras

x

  

Brunei Darussalam

   

Hungary

   

Bulgaria

   

India

   

Burkina Faso

x

  

Indonesia

   

Burundi

x

 

x

Iran, I.R. of

   

Cambodia

x

  

Iraq

  

x

Cameroon

x

  

Jamaica

   

Cape Verde

 

x

 

Jordan

   

Central African Rep.

x

 

x

Kazakhstan

   

Chad

x

 

x

Kenya

x

  

Chile

   

Kiribati

x

x

x

China,P.R.: Mainland

   

Kosovo, Republic of

  

x

Colombia

   

Kuwait

   

Comoros

x

x

x

Kyrgyz Republic

x

  

Congo, Dem. Rep. of

x

 

x

Lao People’s Dem.Rep

x

  

Congo, Republic of

x

 

x

Latvia

   

Costa Rica

   

Lebanon

   

Cote d’lvoire

x

 

x

Lesotho

x

  

Croatia

   

Liberia

x

 

x

Djibouti

x

x

 

Libya

   

Dominica

 

x

 

Lithuania

   

Macedonia, FYR

   

Senegal

x

  

Madagascar

x

  

Serbia, Republic of

   

Malawi

x

  

Seychelles

 

x

 

Malaysia

   

Sierra Leone

x

 

x

Maldives

 

x

 

Solomon Islands

x

x

x

Mali

x

  

South Africa

   

Mauritania

x

  

Sri Lanka

   

Mauritius

  

x

St. Kitts and Nevis

 

x

 

Mexico

   

St. Lucia

 

x

 

Moldova

x

  

St. Vincent & Grens.

 

x

 

Mongolia

x

  

Sudan

x

 

x

Montenegro

 

x

 

Suriname

 

x

 

Morocco

   

Swaziland

 

x

 

Mozambique

x

  

Syrian Arab Republic

   

Myanmar

x

 

x

Tajikistan

x

 

x

Namibia

   

Tanzania

x

  

Nepal

x

 

x

Thailand

   

Nicaragua

x

  

Timor-Leste

 

x

x

Niger

x

  

Togo

x

 

x

Nigeria

x

  

Tonga

 

x

 

Oman

   

Trinidad and Tobago

 

x

 

Pakistan

   

Tunisia

   

Panama

   

Turkey

   

Papua New Guinea

x

  

Turkmenistan

   

Paraguay

   

Uganda

x

  

Peru

   

Ukraine

   

Philippines

   

United Arab Emirates

   

Poland

   

Uruguay

   

Qatar

   

Uzbekistan

x

  

Romania

   

Vanuatu

 

x

 

Russian Federation

   

Venezuela, Rep. Bol.

   

Rwanda

x

  

Vietnam

x

  

Samoa

 

x

 

Yemen, Republic of

x

 

x

Sao Tome & Principe

x

x

x

Zambia

x

  

Saudi Arabia

   

Zimbabwe

x

 

x

  1. aData were not avaiable for Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and Tuvalu.
  2. bMarshall Islands, Micronesia, Somalia, Tuvalu are not included in the database. West Bank and Gaza and Western Sahara are not part of the Fund.

Appendix F: Net Flows to Selected LICs

See Figures 15 and 16.

Figure 15
figure 15

Source: Extended LIC database.

Net Non-FDI private Flows to Selected LICs (percent of GDP)

Figure 16
figure 16

Source: Extended LIC database.

Net Non-FDI Private Flows to Selected LICs (percent of GDP)

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Araujo, J.D., David, A.C., van Hombeeck, C. et al. Non-FDI Capital Inflows in Low-Income Countries: Catching the Wave?. IMF Econ Rev 65, 426–465 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-016-0025-x

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