Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 169–184

Cynicism and Morality


DOI: 10.1007/s10677-010-9250-y

Cite this article as:
Vice, S. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2011) 14: 169. doi:10.1007/s10677-010-9250-y


Our attitude towards cynicism is ambivalent: On the one hand we condemn it as a character failing and a trend that is undermining political and social life; on the other hand, we are often impressed by the apparent realism and honesty of the cynic. My aim in this paper is to offer an account of cynicism that can explain both our attraction and aversion. After defending a particular conception of cynicism, I argue that most of the work in explaining the fault of cynicism can be done by referring not to the cynic’s beliefs about humanity, but to the attitude cultivated as a response to that belief. This attitude is hostile to the virtues of faith, hope and charity, upon which relationships and our sense of moral community depend. In conclusion, I suggest that holding the cynical belief is itself immoral, and that cynicism is disrespectful and destructive of morality.



Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentRhodes UniversityGrahamstownSouth Africa