A differential game studies system dynamics determined by the interactions of agents with divergent purposes. As a limit form of multi-stage games, its non-cooperative solution is subgame perfect; thus it may facilitate the study of credible threats and repeated play. Reducing each stage to a single point in continuous time, differential game applies control theoretic tools (including phase diagrams) to yield results more general and more detailed than other methods. Its applications range from common-property resource utilization to macro-economic stabilization.
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