The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Incomplete Contracts

  • Oliver Hart
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_694

Abstract

The past decade has witnessed a growing interest in contract theories of various kinds. This development is partly a reaction to our rather thorough understanding of the standard theory of perfect competition under complete markets, but more importantly to the resulting realization that this paradigm is insufficient to accommodate a number of important economic phenomena. Studying in more detail the process of contracting – particularly its hazards and imperfections – is a natural way to enrich and amend the idealized competitive model in an attempt to fit the evidence better.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Bibliography

  1. Becker, G. 1964. Human capital. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Ben-Porath, Y. 1980. The F-connection: Families, friends, and firms and the organization of exchange. Population and Development Review 6: 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bull, C. 1985. The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. New York: C.V. Starr Center, New York University.Google Scholar
  4. Crawford, V. 1986. Long-term relationships governed by short-term contracts. Princeton: Princeton University.Google Scholar
  5. Dye, R. 1985. Costly contract contingencies. International Economic Review 26 (1): 233–250.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Freixas, X., R. Guesnerie, and J. Tirole. 1985. Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect. Review of Economic Studies 52(2): 169, 173–192.Google Scholar
  7. Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. 1986. The Folk Theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information. Econometrica 54 (3): 533–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Goldberg, V., and J. Erickson. 1982. Long-term contracts for petroleum coke. Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 206, University of California, Davis, September.Google Scholar
  9. Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94 (4): 691–719.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Grossman, S., and O. Hart. 1987. Vertical integration and the distribution of property rights. In Economic policy in theory and practice, Sapir conference volume. London: Macmillan Press.Google Scholar
  11. Grout, P. 1984. Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: A Nash bargaining approach. Econometrica 52 (2): 449–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hart, O., and B. Holmstrom. 1987. The theory of contracts. In Advances in economic theory, fifth World Congress, ed. T. Bewley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1985. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. London School of Economics, Working Paper.Google Scholar
  14. Joskow, P. 1985. Vertical integration and long-term contracts. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, Spring.Google Scholar
  15. Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 297–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Kreps, D. 1984. Corporate culture and economic theory. Mimeo: Stanford University.Google Scholar
  17. Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 253–279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Kydland, F., and E. Prescott. 1977. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85 (3): 473–492.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Macaulay, S. 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. American Sociological Review 28: 55–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Milgrom, P., and D.J. Roberts. 1982. Predation, reputation and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 280–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Shavell, S. 1980. Damage measures for breach of contract. Bell Journal of Economics 11 (2): 466–490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Simon, H. 1982. Models of bounded rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  23. Thomas, J., and T. Worrall. 1984. Self-enforcing wage contracts. Mimeo: University of Cambridge.Google Scholar
  24. Williamson, O. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oliver Hart
    • 1
  1. 1.