Abstract
The most general model used to describe conflict situations is the extensive form model, which specifies in detail the dynamic evolution of each situation and thus provides an exact description of ‘who knows what when’ and ‘what is the consequence of which’. The model should contain all relevant aspects of the situation; in particular, any possibility of (pre)commitment should be explicitly included. This implies that the game should be analysed by solution concepts from noncooperative game theory, that is, refinements of Nash equilibria. The term extensive form game was coined in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in which a set theoretic approach was used. We will describe the graph theoretical representation proposed in Kuhn (1953) that has become the standard model. For convenience, attention will be restricted to finite games.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Bibliography
Aumann, R.J. 1964. Mixed and behavior strategies in infinite extensive games. In Advances in game theory, ed. M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Aumann, R.J., and M. Maschler. 1972. Some thoughts on the minimax principle. Management Science 18(5): 54–63.
Harsanyi, J.C. 1967–8. Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ players. Management Science 14; Pt I, (3), November 1967, 159–182; Pt II, (5), January 1968, 320–334; Pt III, (7), March 1968, 486–502.
Kohlberg, E., and J.-F. Mertens. 1984. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Mimeo, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Reprinted in Econometrica 53, 1985, 1375–1385.
Kreps, D.M., and R. Wilson. 1982. Sequential equilibria. Econometrica 50(4): 863–894.
Kuhn, H.W. 1953. Extensive games and the problem of information. Annals of Mathematics Studies 28: 193–216.
Myerson, R.B. 1978. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory 7(2): 73–80.
Myerson, R.B. 1986. Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54(2): 323–358.
Selten, R. 1965. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121: 301–324; 667–689.
Selten, R. 1975. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory 4(1): 25–55.
Thompson, F.B. 1952. Equivalence of games in extensive form, RAND Publication RM–769. Santa Monica: Rand Corp.
Van Damme, E.E.C. 1983. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 219. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Van Damme, E.E.C. 1984. A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games. International Journal of Game Theory 13(1): 1–13.
Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zermelo, E. 1913. Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels. Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians 2: 501–504.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Van Damme, E. (2018). Extensive Form Games. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_657
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_657
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences