The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Bribery

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_643

Abstract

Bribery is a form of rent-seeking meant to induce officials to serve private interests. Principal–agent relations are at the heart of the economic analysis of the subject. Bribery undermines government functioning by influencing electoral outcomes, lowering the benefits from public contracts, distorting the allocation of public benefits and costs, and introducing delay and red tape. Empirical work documents the negative consequences of corruption, and economic theory helps one understand the underlying incentives for payoffs.

Keywords

Bribery Bureaucracy Campaign finance, economics of Corruption Democracy Presidential democracy Principal and agent Privatization Procurement, government Proportional representation Public interest Public services Rent seeking 

JEL Classifications

H8 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Bibliography

  1. Bardhan, P. 1997. Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature 35: 1320–1346.Google Scholar
  2. Becker, G.S., and G.J. Stigler. 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Glaeser, E.L., and C. Goldin. 2006. Corruption and reform: Lessons from America’s economic history. Chicago: Chicago University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Graf Lambsdorff, J. 2006. Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries? In Rose-Ackerman (2006).Google Scholar
  5. Heidenheimer, A.J., M. Johnston, and V.T. LeVine, eds. 1980. Political corruption: A handbook. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
  6. Kaufmann, D., and A. Kraay. 2002. Growth without governance. Economica 3: 169–229.Google Scholar
  7. Kunicová, J., and S. Rose-Ackerman. 2005. Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. British Journal of Political Science 35: 573–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Leff, N. 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist 8 (3): 8–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Rose-Ackerman, S. 1978. Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Academic.Google Scholar
  10. Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. Corruption and government: Causes consequences and reform. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Rose-Ackerman, S. 2004. Governance and corruption. In Global crises, global solutions, ed. B. Lomborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Rose-Ackerman, S., ed. 2006. International handbook on the economics of corruption. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  13. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 599–617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman
    • 1
  1. 1.