The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Conjectural Equilibria

  • F. H. Hahn
Reference work entry


In imperfectly competitive economies, agents must take note of the effects of their decisions on the market environment. Such effects, being uncertain, are the subject of conjecture. Even if conjectures are not derivable from some first principles of rationality, conjectural theories are of interest because they attempt a general equilibrium analysis of non-perfect competition. The conjectural approach takes proper and explicit note of the perceptions by individuals of their market environment; it is possible that what is the case may depend on what agents believe to be the case.


Bootstrap equilibria Conjectural equilibria Duopoly Extensive form games Fixprice equilibria Fixprice models Game theory General equilibrium Imperfect competition No surplus condition Perfectly competitive equilibrium Rational conjectural quilibrium Reasonable conjectures Sequential equilibrium 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • F. H. Hahn
    • 1
  1. 1.