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Coase Theorem

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Abstract

The Coase Theorem holds that, regardless of the initial allocation of property rights and choice of remedial protection, the market will determine ultimate allocations of legal entitlements, based on their relative value to different parties. Coase’s assertion has occasioned intense debate. This article provides an intellectual history of Coase’s fundamental theorem and surveys the legal and economic literature that has developed around it. It appraises the most notable attacks to the Coase Theorem, and examines its methodological implications and normative and practical significance in legal and policy settings.

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Parisi, F. (2018). Coase Theorem. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_517

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