The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Assignment Problems

  • Martin Beckmann
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_429

Abstract

Suppose each member i from one class of objects (persons, firms) i = 1, …, n is matched with one object j from another class of equal size (jobs, locations) j = 1, …, n and the economic outcome is measurable in money terms aij. Let xij = 1 when object i is assigned to object j and xij = 0 otherwise. The payoff of this matching is then \( {\sum}_{ij}{a}_{ij}{x}_{ij} \).It represents gross profits (profits before wages or rents) in the assignment of persons to jobs and of firms to locations.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Beckmann
    • 1
  1. 1.