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Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities

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Abstract

Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities are defined (Bhagwati 1982a) as ways of making a profit (that is, income) by undertaking activities which are directly (that is, immediately, in their primary impact) unproductive, in the sense that they produce pecuniary returns but do not produce goods or services that enter a conventional utility function or inputs into such goods and services.

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Bhagwati, J.N. (2018). Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_397

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