The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

International Coordination in Asylum Provision

  • Yuji Tamura
Reference work entry


This article summarises theoretical studies on asylum provision in multi-country settings. The common feature of their models is the assumption that asylum-related policies of safe countries generate cross-border externalities. The presence of externalities results in inefficiently low provision of asylum. The studies explore ways to increase asylum provision to the efficient level, but reveal more difficulties than a solution.


Asylum provision Asylum seeker Cross-border externalities International coordination International migration International public goods Refugee Refugee protection 

JEL Classifications

F22 F53 H87 O15 
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I received useful comments and helpful suggestions from two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are mine.


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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuji Tamura
    • 1
  1. 1.