The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Matching Models: Empirics

  • Jeremy T. Fox
Reference work entry


A matching model takes a set of payoffs or outputs for all possible matches and produces a set of matches where no couple would prefer to deviate and become matched, instead of their assigned matches. Matching models are increasingly being estimated in empirical work in industrial organization, labour economics, public economics, and other fields. This article surveys methods for and applications of structural estimation for two-sided matching games.


Cooperative games Econometrics Family economics Industrial organization Labour market Marriage market Matching models Mergers Pairwise stability Structural estimation Two-sided matching games 

JEL Classifications

C78 C25 C35 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeremy T. Fox
    • 1
  1. 1.