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Matching Models: Empirics

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Abstract

A matching model takes a set of payoffs or outputs for all possible matches and produces a set of matches where no couple would prefer to deviate and become matched, instead of their assigned matches. Matching models are increasingly being estimated in empirical work in industrial organization, labour economics, public economics, and other fields. This article surveys methods for and applications of structural estimation for two-sided matching games.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Jeremy T. Fox

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  1. Jeremy T. Fox
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Fox, J.T. (2018). Matching Models: Empirics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2971

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