Abstract
Since the early 1990s, communication has become a primary tool for monetary authorities in managing expectations, both of financial markets and of the wider public, and an important ingredient in making the central bank accountable. The rapidly growing literature on central bank communication clearly confirms the importance of communication in managing expectations, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Yet there is a large degree of heterogeneity in communication practices across monetary authorities in the world, and there continues to be a lively and controversial debate about what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.
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The views expressed in this article do not necessarily coincide with those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
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Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M. (2018). Central Bank Communication. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2967
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2967
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