The Marshall Plan transferred over US$12.5 billion to Western European countries between 1948 and 1951. This article contrasts the main views on its impact on the post-war European performance. It concludes that, although the direct impact of the plan through private and public investment was rather limited, Marshall Aid provided the recipient economies with a temporary solution for the severe dollar constraint that posed a threat to the continuation of the European miracle. Furthermore the Plan played an important role in promoting collaboration among former adversaries.
KeywordsAid Marshall Plan OEEC Post-war economics
JEL ClassificationsN14 F35
I would like to thank Markus Poschke for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course all remaining errors are mine.
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