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Bidding Rings

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
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Abstract

A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.

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Bibliography

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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Asker, J. (2018). Bidding Rings. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2925

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