The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Bidding Rings

  • John Asker
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2925

Abstract

A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.

Keywords

Cartel Antitrust Bidding ring Bid rigging Sherman Act Auctions Price fixing Bid rotation Collusion 

JEL Classifications

D44 K21 L41 L12 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Asker
    • 1
  1. 1.