Abstract
Elinor Ostrom, a recipient of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009, had a foundational contribution to the Public Choice movement and to the rise of the new institutionalism and has been a key figure in the resurgence of political economy. Her studies of common pool resources, economic governance and institutional diversity are an attempt to transcend the ‘markets vs. states’ dichotomy and are marked by a distinctive approach, relying on multiple methods, interdisciplinary collaborative teamwork and the primacy of empirical observations in field and laboratory settings.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Bibliography
Aligica, P.D., and P. Boettke. 2009. Challenging institutional analysis and development: The Bloomington school. New York: Routledge.
Buchanan, J. 1977. Democracy in deficit (with R. Wagner). New York: Academic.
Buchanan, J.M., and G. Tullock. 1962. The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review 57 (2): 347–359.
Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Elinor Ostrom Nobel Prize web page. 2009. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/index.html
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
McGinnis, M.D., ed. 1999. Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
McGuire, T., M. Coiner, and L. Spancake. 1979. Budget maximizing agencies and efficiency in government. Public Choice 34 (3/4): 333–359.
Niskanen, W.A. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Olson, M. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1968. Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior. Public Choice 5: 87–104.
Ostrom, E. 1972. Metropolitan reform: Propositions derived from two traditions. Social Science Quarterly 53: 474–493.
Ostrom, E., ed. 1976a. The delivery of urban services: Outcomes of change. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Ostrom, E. 1976b. Size and performance in a federal system. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 6 (2): 33–73.
Ostrom, E. 1983. A public choice approach to metropolitan institutions: Structure, incentives, and performance. The Social Science Journal 20 (3): 79–96.
Ostrom, E. 1986. An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48 (1): 3–25.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1998a. The comparative study of public economies. Presented upon acceptance of the Frank E. Seidman distinguished award in political economy. Memphis: P.K. Seidman Foundation.
Ostrom, E. 1998b. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American Political Science Review 92 (1): 1–22.
Ostrom, E. 1999. Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493–535.
Ostrom, E. 2000. The danger of self-evident truth. PS: Political Science & Politics 31 (1): 33–44.
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ostrom, E. 2010. A long polycentric journey. Annual Review of Political Science 13: 1–23.
Ostrom, V., and E. Ostrom. 1965. A behavioral approach to the study of intergovernmental relations. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 359: 137–146.
Ostrom, V., and E. Ostrom. 1971. Public choice: A different approach to the study of public administration. Public Administration Review 31 (2): 203–216.
Ostrom, V., and E. Ostrom. 1977. Public goods and public choices. In Alternatives for delivering public services. Toward improved performance, ed. E.S. Savas, 7–49. Boulder: Westview Press.
Ostrom, E., and R.B. Parks. 1973. Suburban police departments: Too many and too small? In The urbanization of the suburbs, ed. L.H. Masotti and J.K. Hadden, 367–402. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Ostrom, E., and R.B. Parks. 1999. Neither gargantua nor the land of lilliputs: Conjectures on mixed systems of metropolitan organization. In Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis, ed. M.D. McGinnis, 284–305. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, E., and J. Walker, eds. 2003. Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. New York: Russell Sage Found.
Ostrom, V., C.M. Tiebout, and R.L. Warren. 1961. The organization of government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry. American Political Science Review 55: 831–842.
Ostrom, E., W. Baugh, R. Guarasci, R.B. Parks, and G.P. Whitaker. 1973. Community organization and the provision of police services. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks, and G.P. Whitaker. 1978a. Patterns of metropolitan policing. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Ostrom, E., R.B. Parks, G.P. Whitaker, and S.L. Percy. 1978b. The public service production process: A framework for analyzing police services. Policy Studies Journal 7: 381–389.
Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86 (2): 404–417.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker. 1994. Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, E., M. Janssen, and J. Anderies. 2007. Going beyond panaceas. PNAS 104 (39): 15176–15178.
Poteete, A., M. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2010. Working together: Collective action, the commons, and multiple methods in practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Romer, T., and H. Rosenthal. 1978. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33 (4): 27–43.
Schlager, E., and E. Ostrom. 1992. Property-rights regimes and natural resources: A conceptual analysis. Land Economics 68 (3): 249–262.
Schumpeter, J.A. 1942. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
Stigler, G.J. 1962. The tenable range of functions of local government. In Private wants and public needs, ed. E.S. Phelps, 167–176. New York: Norton.
Tullock, G. 1970. Private wants, public means: An economic analysis of the desirable scope of government. New York: Basic Books.
Zimmerman, J.F. 1970. Metropolitan reform in the U.S.: An overview. Public Administration Review 30: 531–543.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Aligica, P.D., Boettke, P. (2018). Ostrom, Elinor (1933–2012). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2923
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2923
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences