The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Executive Compensation

  • Michael L. Bognanno
Reference work entry


Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is defined as the sum of base pay, bonuses, stock grants, stock options, other forms of compensation and benefits. Inflation-adjusted, median total CEO compensation in the United States almost tripled between 1992 and 2000, with grants of stock options evolving to be the largest component of compensation. This article presents the arguments for and against this level and composition of CEO compensation.


Agency framework CEO Executive compensation Stock options 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael L. Bognanno
    • 1
  1. 1.