The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Approval Voting

  • Enriqueta Aragones
  • Micael Castanheira
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2917

Abstract

In a single-winner voting system, approval voting gives voters the possibility to cast a ballot for (or ‘approve of’) as many candidates as they wish – that is, voters are freed from the constraint of voting for only one candidate. The candidate receiving the greatest total number of votes is declared the winner. Approval voting has several compelling advantages over other voting procedures, and has been used by various governments and organisations around the world.

Keywords

Approval voting Condorcet winner Strategic voting Voting systems 

JEL Classifications

D71 D72 
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Bibliography

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enriqueta Aragones
    • 1
  • Micael Castanheira
    • 1
  1. 1.