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Roth, Alvin (Born 1951)

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of the theory, conducted laboratory experiments (another field of study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice.

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Bibliography

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    Article  Google Scholar 

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  • Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.

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  • Roth, A. 1982a. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.

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  • Roth, A. 1982b. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.

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  • Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.

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  • Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.

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  • Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.

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  • Roth, A. 2008a. What have we learned from market design? Hahn Lecture. Economic Journal, 118: 285–310.

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  • Roth, A. 2008b. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. International Journal of Game Theory (Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday), 36: 537–569.

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  • Roth, A. and M.K. Malouf. 1979. Game theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574–594.

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  • Roth, A., and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005a. Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic Theory 125: 151–188.

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  • Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005b. Kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 376–380.

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  • Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2007. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review 97: 828–851.

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  • Shapley, L., and H. Scarf. 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 23–37.

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  • Slonin, R. and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.

    Google Scholar 

Major Publications

  • Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. and M.K. Malouf. 1979. Game theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574–594.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1982. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1985. The college admission problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 277–288.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagel, J., and A. Roth (eds.). 1995. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., and Erev, I. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erev,I. and A. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slonin, R., and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagel, J. and A. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 201–235.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., and A. Ockenfels. 2002. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review 92: 1093–1103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99: 1954–1978.

    Article  Google Scholar 

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Al Roth and Fanqi Shi for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-349-95121-5

    Fuhito Kojima

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  1. Fuhito Kojima
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Kojima, F. (2018). Roth, Alvin (Born 1951). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2873

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