The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Roth, Alvin (Born 1951)

  • Fuhito Kojima
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2873

Abstract

Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of the theory, conducted laboratory experiments (another field of study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice.

Keywords

Deferred acceptance algorithm Game theory kidney exchange Labour market Market design Matching NRMP Roth Roth–Peranson algorithm School choice Stability 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Al Roth and Fanqi Shi for helpful comments.

Bibliography

  1. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., and T. Sönmez. 2003. School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review 93: 729–747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2005a. The New York City high school match. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 364–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, A. Roth, and T. Sönmez. 2005b. The Boston public school match. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 368–371.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Abdulkadirog lu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99: 1954–1978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Ashlagi, I., and A. Roth. 2011. New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 102: 354–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Ashlagi, I., and A. Roth. 2012. Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. Cambridge, MA: Mimeo.Google Scholar
  7. Ashlagi, I., M. Braverman, and A. Hassidim. 2011. Stability in large matching markets with complementarities. Mimeo.Google Scholar
  8. Dubins, L.E., and D.A. Freedman. 1981. Machiavelli and the Gale–Shapley algorithm. American Mathematical Monthly 88: 484–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Erev, I., and A. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.Google Scholar
  10. Gale, D., and L. Shapley. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Immorlica, N., and M. Mahdian. 2005. Marriage, honesty, and stability. In Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 53–62. New York: Association for Computing Machinery Philadelphia.Google Scholar
  12. Jevons, W. 1876. Money and the mechanism of exchange. New York: D. Appleton and Company.Google Scholar
  13. Kagel, J., and A. Roth (eds.). 1995. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Kagel, J. and A. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 201–235.Google Scholar
  15. Kojima, F., and P. Pathak. 2009. Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets. American Economic Review 99: 608–627.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Kojima, F., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Matching with couples. Cambridge, MA: Mimeo.Google Scholar
  17. Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
  18. Roth, A. 1982a. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Roth, A. 1982b. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.Google Scholar
  21. Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.Google Scholar
  22. Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.Google Scholar
  23. Roth, A. 2008a. What have we learned from market design? Hahn Lecture. Economic Journal, 118: 285–310.Google Scholar
  24. Roth, A. 2008b. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. International Journal of Game Theory (Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday), 36: 537–569.Google Scholar
  25. Roth, A. 2013. Intellectual autobiography. Prepared by the Laureate to be posted at Nobel Organization’s website: http://www.nobelprize.org/
  26. Roth, A. and I. Erev. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.Google Scholar
  27. Roth, A. and M.K. Malouf. 1979. Game theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574–594.Google Scholar
  28. Roth, A., and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.Google Scholar
  29. Roth, A., and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.Google Scholar
  30. Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.Google Scholar
  31. Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.Google Scholar
  33. Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.Google Scholar
  34. Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005a. Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic Theory 125: 151–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005b. Kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 376–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2007. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review 97: 828–851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Shapley, L., and H. Scarf. 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 23–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Slonin, R. and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.Google Scholar

Major Publications

  1. Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.Google Scholar
  2. Roth, A. and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.Google Scholar
  3. Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
  4. Roth, A. and M.K. Malouf. 1979. Game theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574–594.Google Scholar
  5. Roth, A. 1982. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.Google Scholar
  6. Roth, A. 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.Google Scholar
  7. Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.Google Scholar
  8. Roth, A. 1985. The college admission problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 277–288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.Google Scholar
  11. Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.Google Scholar
  12. Kagel, J., and A. Roth (eds.). 1995. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Roth, A., and Erev, I. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.Google Scholar
  14. Erev,I. and A. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.Google Scholar
  15. Slonin, R., and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.Google Scholar
  16. Roth, A. and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.Google Scholar
  17. Kagel, J. and A. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 201–235.Google Scholar
  18. Roth, A., and A. Ockenfels. 2002. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review 92: 1093–1103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.Google Scholar
  20. Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.Google Scholar
  21. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99: 1954–1978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fuhito Kojima
    • 1
  1. 1.