Skip to main content

Shapley, Lloyd S. (Born 1923)

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
  • 19 Accesses

Abstract

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation. Shapley’s contributions have led to a broad range of important achievements, such as the exploration of stable solutions for matching and exchange, the measurement of power and a deeper understanding of market economies. His contributions to non-cooperative game theory include the introduction of stochastic games, strategic market games and potential games. Shapley shared with Alvin E. Roth the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   6,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   8,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Aumann, R.J. 1962. Utility theory without the completeness axiom. Econometrica 30(3): 445–462.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.J., and M. Kurz. 1977. Power and taxes. Econometrica 45(5): 1137–1161.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bahn, O., M. Breton, L. Sbragia, and G. Zaccour. 2009. Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries. International Transactions in Operational Research 16(3): 307–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergantiños, G., and J.J. Vidal-Puga. 2007. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137(1): 326–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Billera, L.J. 1974. On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(2): 129–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Debreu, G., and H. Scarf. 1963. A limit theorem on the core of an economy. International Economic Review 4(3): 235–246.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, D.B. 1959. Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. In Contributions to the theory of games IV, ed. A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J.C. 1963. A simplified bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game. International Economic Review 4(2): 194–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S., and A. Mas-Colell. 1989. Potential, value, and consistency. Econometrica 57(3): 589–614.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, M.O. 2008. Social and economic networks. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lejano, R.P., and C.A. Davos. 1999. Cooperative solutions for sustainable resource management. Environmental Management 24(2): 167–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leonard, R. 2010. Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the creation of game theory: From chess to social science, 1900–1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Littlechild, S.C., and G.F. Thompson. 1977. Aircraft landing fees: A game theory approach. The Bell Journal of Economics 8(1): 186–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maschler, M., and G. Owen. 1989. The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. International Journal of Game Theory 18(4): 389–407.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J. Green. 1995. Microeconomic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moulin, H. 1991. Axioms of cooperative decision making, Econometric Society Monographs, Vol. 15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, R.B. 1992. Fictitious-transfer solutions in cooperative game theory. In Rational interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi, ed. R. Selten, 13–33. Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Niyato, D. and Hossain, E. 2006. A cooperative game framework for bandwidth allocation in 4G heterogeneous wireless networks. ICC’06. IEEE International Conference on Communications, 9, 4357–4362.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qin, C.-Z. 1993. A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games. International Journal of Game Theory 22(4): 335–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A.E., and M.A.O. Sotomayor. 1992. Two-Sided Matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, Vol. 18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samet, D., and Z. Safra. 2005. A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players. Games and Economic Behavior 50(1): 89–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. 1982. Game theory in the social sciences: Concepts and solutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Starr. 1969. Quasi-equilibria in markets with non-convex preferences. Econometrica 37(1): 25–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P. 1985. Monotonic solutions of cooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory 14: 65–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Baucells, M., Lejano, R., Qin, CZ. (2018). Shapley, Lloyd S. (Born 1923). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2866

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics