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Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), or the $700 billion bailout, has been the subject of much academic interest. Here the rigorous studies on the programs of this massive intervention into the financial sector are reviewed. While considerable work has been done on the bank bailouts in the TARP, the troubled asset programs, automotive rescues, homeowner assistance programs, and ad hoc bailouts have not been subjected to much theoretical modelling or empirical research.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5

    Linus Wilson

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Wilson, L. (2018). Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2862

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