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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics pp 8260–8263Cite as

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Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets

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Abstract

Despite the robust tendency of laboratory markets to generate competitive outcomes, some market designs deviate persistently from competitive predictions. This article discusses the primary drivers of supra-competitive prices that have been observed in market experiments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Douglas D. Davis

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  1. Douglas D. Davis
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Davis, D.D. (2018). Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2836

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