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Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

Despite the robust tendency of laboratory markets to generate competitive outcomes, some market designs deviate persistently from competitive predictions. This article discusses the primary drivers of supra-competitive prices that have been observed in market experiments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Douglas D. Davis

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  1. Douglas D. Davis
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Davis, D.D. (2018). Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2836

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