The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets

  • Douglas D. Davis
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2836

Abstract

Despite the robust tendency of laboratory markets to generate competitive outcomes, some market designs deviate persistently from competitive predictions. This article discusses the primary drivers of supra-competitive prices that have been observed in market experiments.

JEL Classification

C9 L1 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Douglas D. Davis
    • 1
  1. 1.