The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets

  • Douglas D. Davis
Reference work entry


Despite the robust tendency of laboratory markets to generate competitive outcomes, some market designs deviate persistently from competitive predictions. This article discusses the primary drivers of supra-competitive prices that have been observed in market experiments.

JEL Classification

C9 L1 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Douglas D. Davis
    • 1
  1. 1.