Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets
Despite the robust tendency of laboratory markets to generate competitive outcomes, some market designs deviate persistently from competitive predictions. This article discusses the primary drivers of supra-competitive prices that have been observed in market experiments.
JEL ClassificationC9 L1
- Davis, D.D., and C.A. Holt. 1993. Experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
- Fouraker, L.E., and S. Siegel. 1963. Bargaining behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
- Holt, C.A. 1995. Industrial organization: A survey of laboratory research. In The handbook of industrial organization, ed. J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
- Ruffle, B.J. 2000. Some factors affecting demand withholding in posted-offer markets. Economic Theory 16: 529–544.Google Scholar