The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Collective Choice Experiments

  • Rick K. Wilson
Reference work entry


Collective choice experiments examine voting mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences. Two general topics have received the most attention. The first pertains to agents deciding on a single collective outcome or policy. The second topic covers election mechanisms that govern candidates and voters.


Agenda control Arrows Theorem Collective choice experiments Electoral mechanisms Median voter Social choice Spatial committee experiments 

JEL Classifications

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rick K. Wilson
    • 1
  1. 1.