Abstract
Antidumping is a legal statute that allows for a remedy to offset the effects of dumped imports. Antidumping has emerged as the preferred method of trade protection, accounting for more disputes than all the other trade statutes combined. The economic rationale for current antidumping statutes is weak and generally inconsistent with competition policies. Empirical evidence suggests that antidumping activity is motivated by the same political economy considerations that lead to other forms of trade protection. The economic impact of antidumping remedies can be significant, often dramatically reducing import flows and imposing welfare costs as great as any current trade distortion.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsBibliography
Anderson, J.E. 1992. Domino dumping I: Competitive exporters. American Economic Review 82: 65–83.
Anderson, J.E. 1993. Domino dumping II: Anti-dumping. Journal of International Economics 35: 133–150.
Belderbos, R.A. 1997. Antidumping and tariff jumping: Japanese firms. DFI in the European Union and the United States. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133: 419–457.
Blonigen, B.A. 2002. Tariff-jumping antidumping duties. Journal of International Economics 57: 31–50.
Blonigen, B.A. 2006. Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity. Canadian Journal of Economics 39: 874–900.
Blonigen, B.A., and Y. Ohno. 1998. Endogenous protection, foreign direct investment, and protection-building trade. Journal of International Economics 46: 205–227.
Blonigen, B.A., and S.E. Haynes. 2002. Antidumping investigations and the passthrough of exchange rates and antidumping duties. American Economic Review 92: 1044–1061.
Blonigen, B.A., and C.P. Bown. 2003. Antidumping and retaliation threats. Journal of International Economics 60: 249–273.
Blonigen, B.A., and T.J. Prusa. 2003. Antidumping. In Handbook of international economics, ed. E. Kwan Choi and J. Harrigan. Malden: Blackwell.
Blonigen, B.A., and J.-H. Park. 2004. Dynamic pricing in the presence of antidumping policy: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review 94: 134–154.
Blonigen, B.A., K. Tomlin, and W.W. Wilson. 2004. Tariff-jumping FDI and domestic firms’ profits. Canadian Journal of Economics 37: 656–677.
Cassing, J., and T. To. 2008. Antidumping, signaling and cheap talk. Journal of International Economics 75: 373–382.
Clarida, R.H. 1996. Dumping in theory, in policy, and in practice. In Fair trade and harmonization, ed. J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
DeVault, J.M. 1993. Economics and the international trade commission. Southern Economic Journal 60: 463–478.
Ethier, W.J., and R.D. Fischer. 1987. The new protectionism. Journal of International Economic Integration 2: 1–11.
Finger, J.M. 1993. Antidumping: How it works and who gets hurt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Fischer, R.D. 1992. Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior. Journal of International Economics 32: 149–163.
Gallaway, M.P., B.A. Blonigen, and J.E. Flynn. 1999. Welfare costs of US antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Journal of International Economics 49: 211–244.
Global Antidumping Database. Online. Available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/. Accessed 12 May 2007.
Hansen, W.L., and T.J. Prusa. 1996. Cumulation and ITC decision making: the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. Economic Inquiry 34: 746–769.
Hansen, W.L., and T.J. Prusa. 1997. The economics and politics of trade policy: An empirical analysis of ITC decision making. Review of International Economics 5: 230–245.
Hartigan, J.C., S. Kamma, and P.R. Perry. 1989. The injury determination category and the value of relief from dumping. The Review of Economics and Statistics 71: 183–186.
Irwin, D.A. 2005. The rise of U.S. antidumping activity in historical perspective. The World Economy 28: 651–668.
Konings, J., and H. Vandenbussche. 2005. Antidumping protection and markups of domestic firms. Journal of International Economics 65: 151–165.
Messerlin, P.A. 1989. The EC antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980–85. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 125: 563–587.
Miranda, J., R.A. Torres, and M. Ruiz. 1998. The international use of antidumping: 1987–1997. Journal of World Trade 32: 5–71.
Moore, M.O. 1992. Rules or politics? An empirical analysis of ITC anti-dumping decisions. Economic Inquiry 30: 449–466.
Prusa, T.J. 1992. Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn? Journal of International Economics 33: 1–20.
Prusa, T.J. 1994. Pricing behavior in the presence of antidumping law. Journal of Economic Integration 9: 260–289.
Prusa, T.J. 1997. The trade effects of US antidumping actions. In The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, ed. R.C. Feenstra. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Prusa, T.J. 2001. On the spread and impact of antidumping. Canadian Journal of Economics 34: 591–611.
Reitzes, J.D. 1993. Antidumping policy. International Economic Review 34: 745–763.
Staiger, R.W. and Wolak, F.A. 1989. Strategic use of antidumping law to enforce tacit international collusion. Working paper no. 3016. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Staiger, R.W., and F.A. Wolak. 1992. The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly. Journal of International Economics 32: 265–287.
Staiger, R.W. and Wolak, F.A. 1994. Measuring industry specific protection: Antidumping in the United States. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Microeconomics 1994, 51–118.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1997. Dumping on free trade: The US import trade laws. Southern Economic Journal 64: 402–424.
Taylor, C.T. 2004. The economic effects of withdrawn antidumping investigations: is there evidence of collusive settlements? Journal of International Economics 62: 295–312.
Tharakan, P.K.M., D. Greenaway, and J. Tharakan. 1998. Cumulation and injury determination of the European community in antidumping cases. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 134: 320–339.
U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Database. Online. Available at: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/Bbruceb/adpage.html. Accessed 12 May 2007.
Veugelers, R., and H. Vandenbussche. 1999. European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion. European Economic Review 47: 1–28.
Zanardi, M. 2004. Antidumping law as a collusive device. Canadian Journal of Economics 37: 95–122.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Blonigen, B.A., Prusa, T.J. (2018). Anti-dumping. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2809
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2809
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences