Abstract
Collective models of the household are based on two fundamental assumptions: (a) each agent is characterized by specific preferences and (b) the decision process results in Pareto-efficient outcomes. The main results of the theory of collective models then refer to the empirical issue of deriving testable restrictions on household behaviour and recovering from this some information on the structural model that can be used to carry out welfare comparisons at the individual level.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Bibliography
Apps, P., and R. Rees. 1997. Collective labor supply and household production. Journal of Political Economy 105: 178–190.
Blundell, R., P.-A. Chiappori, and C. Meghir. 2005. Collective labor supply with children. Journal of Political Economy 113: 1277–1306.
Bourguignon, F., Browning, M., and P.-A. Chiappori. 1995. The collective approach to household behaviour. Working Paper. Paris: DELTA.
Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, P.-A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene. 1993. Intrahousehold allocation of consumption: A model and some evidence from French data. Annales d’économie et de statistique 29: 137–156.
Browning, M., and P.-A. Chiappori. 1998. Efficient intrahousehold allocations: A general characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica 66: 1241–1278.
Chiappori, P.-A. 1988. Rational household labor supply. Econometrica 56: 63–89.
Chiappori, P.-A. 1992. Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy 100: 437–467.
Chiappori, P.-A. 1997. Introducing household production in collective models of labor supply. Journal of Political Economy 105: 191–209.
Chiappori, P.-A., and I. Ekeland. 2003. The micro economics of group behavior: Identification. Working paper. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Chiappori, P.-A., and I. Ekeland 2006. Characterizing group behavior. Journal of Economic Theory (forthcoming).
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix. 2002. Marriage market, divorce legislation, and household labor supply. Journal of Political Economy 110: 37–72.
Donni, O. 2003. Collective household labor supply: Non-participation and income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 87: 1179–1198.
Donni, O. 2004. The intrahousehold allocation of private and public consumption:Theory and some evidence from U.S. data. Working paper. Cergy-Pontoise: University of Cergy-Pontoise.
Donni, O. 2006. Collective consumption and welfare. Canadian Journal of Economics 39: 124–144.
Fong, Y., and J. Zhang. 2001. The identification of unobservable independent and spousal leisure. Journal of Political Economy 109: 191–202.
Leuthold, J. 1968. An empirical study of formula transfers and the work decision of the poor. Journal of Human Resources 1: 312–323.
Manser, M., and M. Brown. 1980. Marriage and household decision making: A bargaining analysis. International Economic Review 21: 31–44.
Mazzocco, M. 2005. Household intertemporal behavior: a collective characterization and empirical tests. Working paper. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
McElroy, M., and M. Horney. 1981. Nash bargained household decisions. International Economic Review 22: 333–349.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Donni, O. (2018). Collective Models of the Household. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2802
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2802
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-95188-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95189-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences