The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Collective Models of the Household

  • Olivier Donni
Reference work entry


Collective models of the household are based on two fundamental assumptions: (a) each agent is characterized by specific preferences and (b) the decision process results in Pareto-efficient outcomes. The main results of the theory of collective models then refer to the empirical issue of deriving testable restrictions on household behaviour and recovering from this some information on the structural model that can be used to carry out welfare comparisons at the individual level.


Collective models of the household Exclusive goods Household behaviour Indirect utility function Pareto efficiency 

JEL Classifications

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier Donni
    • 1
  1. 1.