The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Aumann, Robert J. (Born 1930)

  • Abraham Neyman
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2750

Abstract

Robert Aumann has played an essential and indispensable role in shaping game theory and much of economic theory. He promotes a unified view of the very wide domain of rational behaviour, a domain that encompasses areas of many apparently disparate disciplines, like economics, political science, biology, psychology, mathematics, philosophy, computer science, law and statistics. His contributions have had a most profound impact on the social sciences

Keywords

Aumann, R. J Bounded rationality, Coalitions Common knowledge Continuum of traders Contract curve Convexity Core Core equivalence Correlated equilibrium Folk theorem Game theory Non-transferable utility Perfect competition Rational behaviour Repeated games with incomplete information Shapley value Strong equilibrium Supergames Transferable utility 

JEL Classification

B31 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Bibliography

  1. Debreu, G., and H. Scarf. 1963. A limit theorem on the core of an economy. International Economic Review 4: 236–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Edgeworth, F.Y. 1881. Mathematical psychics. London: Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  3. Hart, S., and A. Neyman. 1995. Introduction. In Games and economic theory, selected contributions in honor of Robert J. Aumann, ed. S. Hart and A. Neyman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Online. Available at http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/neyman/bookintroduction95.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Neyman, A. 2006. Aumann awarded Nobel prize. Notices of the AMS 53: 44–46.Google Scholar
  5. Rubinstein, A. 1976. Equilibrium in supergames. RM-26. Hebrew University of Jerusalem.Google Scholar
  6. Shapley, L.S. 1953. A value for n-person games. In Contributions to the theory of games, vol. 2, ed. H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Shapley, L.S. 1964. Values of large games VII: A general exchange economy with money, RM-4248. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.Google Scholar
  8. Shapley, L.S. 1969. Utility comparison and the theory of games. In La Décision. Paris: CNRS.Google Scholar
  9. Shubik, M. 1959. Edgeworth market games. In Contributions to the theory of games, vol. 4, ed. A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abraham Neyman
    • 1
  1. 1.