The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Campaign Finance, Economics of

  • Scott Ashworth
Reference work entry


This article surveys recent work aimed at evaluating the welfare effects of campaign finance reform. The theoretical literature distinguishes two types of contributor: those who desire ideological policies and those who want personal favours. A series of models shows that these different types of contributor have different implications for campaign finance regulation. The models also give some suggestions about the sort of empirical evidence that would argue for or against certain campaign finance regulations. These suggestions have been followed up by recent empirical work.


Advertising Campaign finance reform Campaign finance, economics of Election Incumbency Matching funds Multiple equilibria Probabilistic voting Voting 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Scott Ashworth
    • 1
  1. 1.