Abstract
Social insurance expenditures are the largest and fastest-growing component of government expenditures in the developed world. The design of social insurance programmes reflects the trade-off between insurance and incentives. This article reviews the impact of social insurance programmes on both insurance against adverse events and incentives for adverse behaviour. It concludes with lessons for optimal social insurance programme design.
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Gruber, J. (2018). Social Insurance and Public Policy. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2734
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2734
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