The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Social Insurance and Public Policy

  • Jonathan Gruber
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2734

Abstract

Social insurance expenditures are the largest and fastest-growing component of government expenditures in the developed world. The design of social insurance programmes reflects the trade-off between insurance and incentives. This article reviews the impact of social insurance programmes on both insurance against adverse events and incentives for adverse behaviour. It concludes with lessons for optimal social insurance programme design.

Keywords

Administrative efficiency Adverse selection Asymmetric information Consumption smoothing Crowding out Defined benefit and defined contribution social insurance Disability insurance Expected utility Experience rating Health insurance Imperfect observability Labour market search Layoffs Leisure Mandatory saving Market failure Moral hazard Paternalism Replacement rates Retirement Risk Self-insurance Social insurance Social Security in the United States Supply-side risk bearing Unemployment durations Unemployment insurance Workers’ compensation 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Gruber
    • 1
  1. 1.