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Fair Allocation

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Abstract

We survey the theory of equity in a variety of concretely specified resource allocation models: classical economies with private goods, economies with production, economies with indivisible goods, when monetary compensations are feasible and when they are not, economies with single-peaked preferences, and economies in which the dividend is a non-homogeneous continuum. We present the central fairness punctual notions, no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence, concepts of equal or equivalent opportunities and the relational principles of monotonicity and consistency.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    William Thomson

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The author would like to thank the National Science Foundation for its support under grant SES 0214691.

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Thomson, W. (2018). Fair Allocation. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2720

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