The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Fair Allocation

  • William Thomson
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2720

Abstract

We survey the theory of equity in a variety of concretely specified resource allocation models: classical economies with private goods, economies with production, economies with indivisible goods, when monetary compensations are feasible and when they are not, economies with single-peaked preferences, and economies in which the dividend is a non-homogeneous continuum. We present the central fairness punctual notions, no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence, concepts of equal or equivalent opportunities and the relational principles of monotonicity and consistency.

Keywords

Consistency Convexity Efficient allocation Egalitarian-equivalent allocation Envy-free allocation Equality of opportunity Fair allocation Indivisible goods Monotonicity Shapley value Single-peaked preferences Solidarity 

JEL Classifications

D2 
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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  • William Thomson
    • 1
  1. 1.