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Procurement

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Abstract

Firms and government agencies rely increasingly on goods and services procured from outside suppliers. How to assure desired quality at a minimal cost in the procurement is often challenging and warrants carefully devised contracting policies. This article reviews several problems arising in procurement and policies designed to remedy them.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Yeon-Koo Che

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  1. Yeon-Koo Che
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© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

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Che, YK. (2018). Procurement. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2716

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