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Reputation

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
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Abstract

We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strengthen them.

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Bibliography

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Cripps, M.W. (2018). Reputation. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2699

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