The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Electricity Markets

  • James Bushnell
  • Catherine Wolfram
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2683

Abstract

In many parts of the world buyers and sellers now trade electrical energy in liberalized markets. These markets have partially replaced cost-based regulation and government ownership.

Keywords

Cost-based regulation Electricity industry Electricity markets Experimental economics Game theory Incentive regulation Investment Liberalization Market power Natural monopoly Oligopoly simulation analysis Privatization Real-Time pricing State-Owned utilities 

JEL Classifications

L66 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Bibliography

  1. Borenstein, S., and S. Holland. 2005. On the efficiency of competitive electricity markets with time-invariant retail prices. RAND Journal of Economics 36: 469–493.Google Scholar
  2. Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell, and F. Wolak. 2002. Measuring market inefficiencies in California’s deregulated wholesale electricity market. American Economic Review 92: 1376–1405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bushnell, J., E. Mansur, and C. Saravia. 2005. Vertical arrangements, market structure, and competition: An analysis of restructured US electricity markets. CSEM working paper WP-126. Berkeley: University of California Energy Institute.Google Scholar
  4. Chao, H.P., and S. Peck. 1992. A market mechanism for electric power transmission. Journal of Regulatory Economics 10: 25–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Fabrizio, K., N. Rose, and C. Wolfram. 2004. Does competition reduce costs? Assessing the impact of regulatory restructuring on US electric generation efficiency. CSEM working paper WP-135. Berkeley: University of California Energy Institute.Google Scholar
  6. Green, R., and D. Newbery. 1992. Competition in the British electricity spot market. Journal of Political Economy 100: 929–953.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Hortascu, A., and S. Puller. 2004. Understanding strategic bidding in restructured electricity markets: A case study of ERCOT. Working paper. Chicago: University of Chicago. Online. Available at http://econweb.tamu.edu/puller/AcadDocs/Hortacsu_Puller.pdf. Accessed 20 July 2005.
  8. Joskow, P. 2005. The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the US. In Electricity restructuring: Choices and challenges, ed. J. Griffen and S. Puller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  9. Joskow, P., and J. Tirole. 2004. Retail electricity competition. CMI working paper 44. Cambridge, MA: MIT.Google Scholar
  10. Newbery, D., and M. Pollitt. 1997. The restructuring and privatization of Britain’s CEGB – was it worth it? Journal of Industrial Economics 45: 269–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Schweppe, F., M. Caramanis, R. Tabors, and R. Bohn. 1988. Spot pricing of electricity. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Waddams, C. 2004. Spoilt for choice? The costs and benefits of opening UK residential energy markets. Working paper 04–1. Norwich: Centre for Competition and Regulation, University of East Anglia.Google Scholar
  13. Wilson, R. 2002. Architecture of power markets. Econometrica 70: 1299–1340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Wolak, F. 2000. An empirical analysis of the impact of hedge contracts on bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market. International Economic Journal 14: 1–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Wolfram, C. 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market. American Economic Review 89: 805–826.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Bushnell
    • 1
  • Catherine Wolfram
    • 1
  1. 1.