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Corporate Law, Economic Analysis of

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Abstract

Economic analysis of corporate law largely focuses on (a) the efficiency of legal rules and the proper role of the law, (b) the ways in which legal rules affect shareholders’ ability to monitor managers, and (c) the effect of limited liability on the relationship between the corporation and third parties. This article reviews the literature in each of these areas.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Robert Daines & Michael Klausner

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  1. Robert Daines
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Daines, R., Klausner, M. (2018). Corporate Law, Economic Analysis of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2643

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