The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Marriage and Divorce

  • Yoram Weiss
Reference work entry


We document the increase in marital turnover and survey economic models of the marriage market. Couples match based on attributes but sorting is constrained by costs of search. Divorce is caused by new information on match quality, and remarriage requires further search. Although most men and women marry, they are single more often than before and more children live in one-parent household. The impact on children depends on child-support transfers. Such transfers may rise with the aggregate divorce (remarriage) rates.


Altruism Assortative matching Child care Collective models Commitment Comparative advantage Complementarity Division of labour Household production Increasing returns Leisure Marriage and divorce Marriage market Matching model Multiple equilibria Poisson process Reservation utility Search models Sharing rules Stable sharing rule Time use Transferable utility Unitary models of the household 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yoram Weiss
    • 1
  1. 1.