Abstract
Social status both affects and is affected by earnings and wealth. Research on status examines status-seeking behaviour, and the impact of acquired and endowed status. Status characteristics such as wealth and education can be acquired; others such as beauty, gender, or race are endowed. Status hierarchies appear to waste resources, as agents expend effort and income acquiring position, but such social structures may also benefit societies.
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Ball, S. (2018). Status and Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2623
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2623
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