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Games in Coalitional Form

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Abstract

How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoffs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of social justice when the context is how people behave in society.

Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory offers a unified framework and solutions for addressing such qsts. This article presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.

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    Ehud Kalai

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Kalai, E. (2018). Games in Coalitional Form. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2615

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