The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Games in Coalitional Form

  • Ehud Kalai
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2615

Abstract

How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoffs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of social justice when the context is how people behave in society.

Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory offers a unified framework and solutions for addressing such qsts. This article presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.

Keywords

Additive games Auction game Aumann–Shapley prices Axiomatic characterizations Balanced games Bargaining Bargaining sets Coalition Coalition formation Coalitional game Coalitional monotonicity Communication graph Consistency Cooperation Cooperative game theory Core Cost allocation Dummy player Egalitarian solution Egalitarian value Equivalence th Flow game Folk th Game theory Games in coalitional form Grand coalition Harsanyi value Imputation Independence of irrelevant alternatives Individual monotonicity Individual rationality Kalai–Smorodinsky solution Kernel Large market games Law of large numbers Linear programming game Majority game Market games Maschler–Perles solution Matching Matching and market design Middleman Monotonicity Nash bargaining games Nash solution Network games No transferable-utility game Nucleolus Pareto optimality Partition games Population monotonicity Profit sharing Raiffa solution Shapley value Simple games Spanning-tree game Stable sets Strategic game theory Supperadditive games Transferable-utility game Voting games 
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Authors and Affiliations

  • Ehud Kalai
    • 1
  1. 1.