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Experimental Methods in Environmental Economics

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
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Abstract

Experimental methods have long played a role in environmental economics. The strong link emerged due to the need to make decisions within the complex confluences of markets, missing markets, and no markets. Two broad areas of experimental work are discussed, institutional and valuation. Institutional experiments help reveal how good ideas for environmental protection can go badly with poorly understood rules and incentives; valuation experiments help illustrate how values for environmental protection depend on the socialization created, directly or indirectly, by the exchange institutions in operation.

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Shogren, J.F. (2018). Experimental Methods in Environmental Economics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2568

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