The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Experimental Methods in Environmental Economics

  • Jason F. Shogren
Reference work entry


Experimental methods have long played a role in environmental economics. The strong link emerged due to the need to make decisions within the complex confluences of markets, missing markets, and no markets. Two broad areas of experimental work are discussed, institutional and valuation. Institutional experiments help reveal how good ideas for environmental protection can go badly with poorly understood rules and incentives; valuation experiments help illustrate how values for environmental protection depend on the socialization created, directly or indirectly, by the exchange institutions in operation.


Asymmetric information Bargaining Coase Theorem Common property resources Endowment effect Environmental economics Experimental methods in environmental economics Hypothetical bias Institutional experiments Land conservation Non-market valuation Pigouvian taxes Pollution permits Provision point mechanism Public goods Social costs Transaction costs Valuation experiments Value elicitation Willingness to accept compensation Willingness to pay 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jason F. Shogren
    • 1
  1. 1.